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 A popular sentiment is that fairness is inexorably subjective and incapable of being 
determined by objective standards. This study, on the other hand, seeks to establish evidence on 
unbiased justice and to propose and demonstrate a general approach for measuring impartial 
views empirically. Most normative justice theories associate impartiality with limited 
information and with consensus, i.e., a high level of agreement about what is right. In both the 
normative and positive literature, information is usually seen as the raw material for self-serving 
bias and disagreement. In contrast, this paper proposes a type of impartiality that is associated 
with a high level of information. The crucial distinction is the emphasis here on the views of 
impartial spectators, rather than implicated stakeholders. I describe the quasi-spectator method, 
i.e., an empirical means to approximate the views of impartial spectators that is based on a direct 
relationship between information and consensus, whereby consensus refers to the level of 
agreement among actual evaluators of real world situations. Results of surveys provide evidence 
on quasi-spectator views and support this approach as a means to elicit moral preferences. By 
establishing a relationship between consensus and impartiality, this paper seeks to help lay an 
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“There is no objective standard of ‘fairness.’ ‘Fairness’ is strictly in the eye of the 
beholder… To a producer or seller, a ‘fair’ price is a high price. To the buyer or 
consumer, a ‘fair’ price is a low price. How is the conflict to be adjudicated?” 
 – Milton Friedman, Newsweek, July 4, 1977. 
 
 The central concern of most normative economics is the distribution of benefits 
and burdens among members of society, i.e., distributive justice. The large volume of 
relatively recent empirical research on justice (or fairness) has demonstrated the 
importance of this value for economic decision-making in both the laboratory and the 
field, e.g., Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004, 2005) and Blinder and Choi (1990). 
Contraposed to these facts, however, is the sceptical position that, at best, views of 
fairness are inexorably biased, or that, at worst, fairness is a vacuous construct employed 
opportunistically. The popular belief expressed in the quote above that “fairness is in the 
eye of the beholder” is one that justice researchers frequently encounter in dealing both 
with the general public and with some academic colleagues. The abandon with which 
people wield fairness arguments, often on opposite sides of the same issue, contributes, 
no doubt, to the impression reflected in this refrain. Indeed, researchers have also 
documented that biased views of fairness significantly impact not only words but 
decisions about the allocation of real economic resources, e.g., Babcock and Loewenstein 
(1997). Nevertheless, this sentiment typically fails to distinguish the fairness of the 
implicated stakeholder from that of the impartial spectator. Moreover, fairness bias 
implies its complement: unbiased fairness. If an impartial standard exists, the crucial 
question, which is both theoretical and at least potentially empirical, is how one can 
identify what is just and the principles, if any, that guide unbiased justice. This paper 
proposes an empirical approach to this question inspired by Adam Smith’s impartial 
spectator model (1759). The evidence presented here indicates the relevance of 
distributive preferences for economic policy across a wide range of real world contexts. It 
is also consistent with the conclusion that there exists an empirical means for identifying 
unbiased views that can inform social choice theory, welfare analysis and public policy. 
 This study employs a simple method with the aim of expanding our understanding 
of two fundamental topics: unbiased justice preferences in real world contexts and the 
nature of impartiality itself. The method of investigation is the one used in most studies 
of empirical social choice, viz., attitude surveys consisting of vignettes (i.e., hypothetical 
scenarios) that elicit preferences over the distribution of benefits or burdens. 
Nevertheless, no previous study, to my knowledge, has addressed the particular problem 
raised here. Different research questions require different methods, and there are 
advantages and disadvantages with any choice. Given the goals of this study, a survey 
method was chosen, because, among other reasons, it allows one better to target impartial 
preferences and to do so over allocations in a wide range of contextually rich 
circumstances like those encountered with real policy analysis. 
 On the first topic of unbiased justice, the questionnaire design was both informed 
by theory and directed toward illuminating practical applications. Although much justice 
research has focused on equality, an important and growing empirical literature reveals 
widespread preferences for unequal allocations, e.g., Cappelen, Hole, Sørensen and 
Tungodden (forthcoming), Ellingsen and Johannesson (2005), Frohlich and Oppenheimer 
(1992), Gächter and Riedl (2005) and Schokkaert and DeVooght (2003). The current 
 1
study is in this vein, and the eight distinct vignettes in the survey prompt more complex 
distributive preferences that correspond to unequal allocations. They describe a wide 
variety of real world ethical concerns, including environmental protection, fair wages, 
welfare, job security, tort law, bioethics, globalization and media ethics. Four scenarios 
vary information related to general justice concepts, including efficiency, equity, need, 
and rectificatory justice. The other four scenarios examine trade-offs between different 
distributive goals. These cases represent an uncharacteristically broad set of real world 
applications for studies in this literature. 
 On the second topic of the paper, impartiality has often been conceptualized in the 
Rawlsian sense: the ideal state for forming judgments about justice is an “original 
position” in which stakeholders are placed behind a veil of ignorance of the specifics 
associated with their stakes. That normative approach suggests that information is 
associated with divergence of views, which is seemingly supported by studies that 
indicate increased information contributes to biased moral views and higher rates of 
dispute. The current study examines an alternate approach to impartiality inspired by 
Adam Smith that seeks to elicit the judgments of impartial spectators, rather than 
implicated stakeholders, who are informed, rather than ignorant, of relevant specifics. 
The working hypothesis is that the impartial spectator, in contrast to the original position, 
can be approximated empirically. But if spectator views can be empirically derived, this 
provides a means for justice scholars to identify general principles of justice, a foundation 
for social choice theory, and a practical guide for evaluating policy and implementing the 
exigencies of justice in real situations. Moreover, the results of the current study indicate 
that fairness information significantly shifts respondents’ views, outweighs the effects of 
personal characteristics and results in a convergence of views, i.e., it significantly reduces 
variance. These patterns bolster the claim that the impartial spectator can be 
approximated in the real world and provide a different perspective from much previous 
theoretical and empirical work. 
 An empirically informed theory of unbiased justice offers an attractive basis for 
both normative and positive analysis. In particular, an impartial spectator theory of justice 
is a promising approach to the kind of broad issues that are of concern to social choice 
theorists. For instance, it can inform questions of voting, income distribution, wealth 
distribution and taxation. An understanding of “unbiased justice” can assist political 
discourse by helping to identify biased claims that are erroneously justified by 
manipulation of justice principles to unjust ends. It also can serve as a guide for economic 
policy in a variety of contexts, including in resolving labour-management conflicts, in the 
regulation of industries, and in the allocation of costs and benefits of public programs. 
 Section 1 of this paper discusses theories of impartiality and summarizes and 
argues for the “quasi-spectator” method employed in this study. Section 2 discusses the 
justice concepts and trade-offs that inform the survey and presents the questions used in 
the study. Section 3 summarizes the results on means and variances and presents the 
results of regression analyses of the relative effects of relevant information versus 




  This section examines different concepts of impartiality and elaborates on the 
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impartial spectator model that is a topic of this study. Then I describe the empirical 
method employed here, which is informed by the spectator model. 
 
1.1. Conceptual framework 
 
 How does one conceptualize impartiality? Philosophers and social scientists have 
proposed various approaches, but two notions of impartiality have dominated most 
normative discourse in economics: the Rawlsian original position and the impartial 
spectator (or impartial observer) model. In The Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls 
explicated a thought experiment called the original position. This is a hypothetical state in 
which self-interested individuals initially choose the principles that guide the basic 
structure of society behind a “veil of ignorance” of any particulars related to themselves, 
including information about their future position in that society. Rawls maintained that, 
under such conditions, there would be a high level of agreement regarding the principles 
of justice, which, he claimed, would protect the interests of the least well off member of 
society. A different approach is the impartial spectator model, which can be traced to 
David Hume (1751 [1983]) and, especially, to Adam Smith in his The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (1759 [1809]). Heirs to Smith’s legacy have stressed different aspects of his 
writings and have interpreted them in different ways. Many readers have focused on 
sympathy, whereby the impartial spectator assumes the positions of affected parties, both 
cognitively and affectively. Common to both Rawls and Smith, however, is the notion 
that impartiality creates consensus. Indeed, Rawls explicitly asserts that, behind a veil of 
ignorance, people would reach unanimous agreement on the principles of justice. The 
relationship between impartiality and consensus is an extremely important, but largely 
ignored, aspect of both normative and positive justice research. Consensus provides a 
compelling foundation for prescriptive claims of the superiority of one set of outcomes, 
principles or ethical theories over another. In addition, some degree of consensus is 
usually critical to the formulation and implementation of policies in most social and 
political institutions. This, therefore, is one of the central subjects of this paper. 
 The chief impartial observer models known to economists are two that Harsanyi 
proposed (although Harsanyi rarely made any connection to Smith). Amiel, Cowell and 
Gaertner (2006) present an interesting empirical investigation of these two models. In the 
one model (1978), Harsanyi proposes that individuals have internalized moral 
preferences, which they might express as third parties (indeed, he suggests they might 
even express these as stakeholders trying to remain impartial). Nevertheless, Harsanyi 
allows that these moral preferences could differ across individuals. In the other model 
(1953, 1955), he proposes that the impartial observer engages in a thought experiment. 
The observer considers the objective and subjective circumstances of every person and 
imagines himself having an equal probability of being each of those persons, ignoring his 
own actual station. This latter model entails judgments from a hypothetical state and, in 
this respect, resembles Rawls’s original position. Both of Harsanyi’s two models are 
formulated in terms of lotteries with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility, and in both cases 
he argues for utilitarian ethics. 
 The models of Rawls and Harsanyi are extremely important contributions to this 
literature. In this paper, however, I wish to examine an interpretation of Smith’s impartial 
spectator model that differs in several respects from these other models. Harsanyi 
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considers choice under risk, and the observers have potentially conflicting moral 
preferences in the one model or engage in reasoning behind a veil of ignorance in the 
other, as with Rawls.1 In contrast, I propose and investigate the impartial spectator as one 
who exists contemporaneously, is present in real people, is informed of the relevant 
circumstances, embraces a common value system and whose judgments do not 
necessarily (and, in Smith’s examples, usually do not explicitly) involve choice under 
risk. Some parts of this characterization are consistent with Rawls or one of the Harsanyi 
models, but none incorporates this particular configuration. Specifically, this impartial 
spectator is not now and has no expectation of ever being implicated in the situation 
being evaluated, that is, he has no stake, real or imagined, that might bias judgments of 
right and wrong. Moreover, the spectator seeks to be fully informed of the relevant 
particulars and processes this information rationally with respect to internalized values. 
Smith believes that sympathetic identification can help one to understand better the 
objective and subjective circumstances of others, so the spectator also engages in a kind 
of exercise. This paper will focus on the incremental impact of adding information on 
spectator views, an aspect of impartiality that has not only been largely neglected but that 
is often considered anathema to impartiality. Nevertheless, it is crucial to exploring both 
the justice principles as well as the very core of the proposed impartiality. 
 Obviously, as with all models of impartiality, the impartial spectator is stated in 
an idealized form. Nevertheless, I believe what is promising about this approach is not 
only its appeal to moral intuition but also its practical implications for empirical ethics 
research. Veil of ignorance approaches have extremely stringent informational 
requirements: agents must reason from self-interest but ignore any and every fact that 
could introduce a self-interested bias into their judgments. The impartial spectator, on the 
other hand, is not denied any information, including about his own station in life. Indeed, 
the spectator is encouraged to acquire all information that might be relevant to reaching 
moral decisions, including possibly from his own experiences and circumstances. 
Impartiality in this model is achieved by considering only evaluations of individuals who 
have no stake in the situation they are judging. 
 The veil of ignorance is problematic on conceptual grounds: how much 
information is enough to evaluate allocations or institutions but not too much to bias 
judgments? Can such conditions exist even hypothetically? Rawls would deny even 
information about risk preference, but it is difficult to imagine the thought experiment 
that obtains under such conditions. Nevertheless, the objection here is that it is even more 
problematic to actualize the veil of ignorance in the real world. Frohlich and 
Oppenheimer (1992) have simulated Rawlsian conditions in the laboratory using subjects 
who in groups reason about and vote on redistribution prior to being informed about their 
individual income classes. Their studies generate fascinating and compelling results 
about group decision making and distributive preferences, which mostly contradict 
Rawls’s claims about those preferences. Nevertheless, it is difficult to conceive that 
people really leave their personal interests and experiences at the laboratory door, as the 
veil of ignorance would require them to do, or that this thought experiment could be 
extended to real world situations where positions are known and stakes are often high. In 
                                                          
1 Traub, Seidl, Schmidt and Levati (2005) report an interesting experiment that examines different types of 
impartiality, including the versions of Rawls and Harsanyi. Contrary to the focus of the current study, 
though, they consider risky choice behind different veils of ignorance. 
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contrast, the impartial spectator is an informed party situated in the real world, even as an 
ideal. Thus, one can more readily conceive of empirical tests of this model. 
 
1.2. Quasi-spectator method 
 
 One can recognize the ideal of the impartial spectator in many real social 
institutions. For example, judges, juries, independent arbitrators and regulators are all 
supposed to be third parties who seek all relevant information on the issues they are 
deciding without being tainted by any claim related to those same issues. Violations to 
this impartiality are often prohibited by law. In matters of jurisprudence, the rules of 
evidence are largely designed with the aim of liberally providing relevant information. 
Nevertheless, the ideal conditions of impartial spectatorship are probably never realized 
in the real world. For example, spectators with no material claim might still interject their 
interests into a situation by vicarious identification with the one stakeholder or the other. 
Even if self-interest plays no real or imagined role, spectator judgments can be biased by 
biased information or biased experiences that impact processing of even complete 
information. Given these facts, is there a means to identify to some degree of certainty 
spectator judgments under the less than ideal conditions that exist in the real world? 
 I propose to take seriously the sometimes implicit and other times explicit claim 
of most normative theory that impartiality results in unanimity. Since the conditions of 
perfect impartiality are presumably never obtained, however, one can at best observe the 
judgments of a “quasi-spectator.” This is an observer who has no salient stakes in the 
matter at hand and is partially, but not completely, informed. Given incomplete 
information, quasi-spectators might still disagree based on their differing assumptions 
about the unknowns. The notion that “true” spectator views can at best be approximated 
is in keeping with the kind of statistical uncertainty with which empirical researchers 
routinely deal and with a distribution of measured views that is not degenerate. But what 
evidence is there that spectator judgments can even be approximated? The critical 
assumption of the quasi-spectator method I propose in this paper is that the answer to this 
question is based on consensus. This is a convergent trend of opinion by quasi-spectators 
that accompanies the addition of relevant information. Spectators are assumed to be 
operating from a common set of values such that, as information related to their values is 
added, their views of what is just will, on average, converge. Thus, complete impartiality 
and, therefore, unanimity are probably never observed in the real world given the 
difficulties of both eradicating all stakes and providing all relevant information. But 
convergence, on average, toward a particular view by quasi-spectators as information is 
added is taken as favourable evidence of the impartial spectator. Consistent with 
normative theory (and empirical method), then, consensus is seen as a central and 
compelling characteristic of an analysis of impartiality. 
 The specific quasi-spectator method of this study is a between subjects survey 
design. There are two treatments. In the low information treatment, one set of respondents 
reads a scenario involving the distribution of some variable of social or economic value, 
e.g., how much to reduce the discharge of a pulp mill’s pollutants into a river given the 
environmental impact and the effect on employment at the mill. The participants are not 
cast in any stakeholder role in the scenario, indeed, the text of some scenarios in this 
study explicitly promotes a third party view, e.g., the pulp mill is portrayed as being 
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located in a different part of the country so as to minimize any imagined concern by 
respondents for their own employment or hardship from the pollution. The response 
format is continuous on a closed interval, e.g., the pollutants can be reduced by any 
amount between 0% and 100%. In the high information treatment, a different group of 
respondents reads a scenario that is identical to the low information one, save the addition 
of a passage that contains supplemental information that is considered relevant. 
Relevance was defined by an empirical criterion, namely, based on whether the 
information generated a statistically significant shift in the mean response of participants 
(this is discussed in greater detail in section 2.2). In the pollution scenario, the additional 
passage provided more information about the consequences of different levels of 
pollution reduction for workers and neighbours of the mill. The between subjects design 
was chosen in order to avoid any tendency on the part of participants consciously to over-
respond or under-respond to the different versions. Consensus consistent with the 
spectator model is seen here as a reduction in the variance around the respective means in 
the high information versus the low information treatments. Demographic information 
was also collected and employed to evaluate the importance for judgments of relevant 
information relative to personal characteristics. 
 The quasi-spectator method described above is very simple, but, to my 
knowledge, no previous study has addressed precisely this question or possessed a design 
consisting of these particular elements. Although it is a prominent feature of normative 
theory, consensus has remained relatively neglected in the empirical analysis of justice. 
In most research, treatment effects have focused on differences in means or categorical 
choices, rather than differences in variance. Thus, most survey studies in this area have 
employed discrete choice formats, e.g., as with the seminal contribution by Yaari and 
Bar-Hillel (1984) to empirical social choice (although Gaertner, 1994, is one exception). 
There are advantages to the discrete choice format (including possibly simplifying the 
cognitive task), but given the interest here not only in means but variance, the continuous 
response format is a more natural choice. The specific manner in which information is 
varied in this study is also significant. As mentioned above, a between subjects design 
was chosen to preclude any interaction between versions of the same question. More 
importantly, most previous studies that vary informational content do so using 
contrasting versions, e.g., the important and seminal survey study of fairness by 
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) presented alternate passages in different versions 
of scenarios. The interesting and informative results of this study stimulated an 
impressive volume of subsequent research. In the current study, on the other hand, the 
focus is on the marginal effect of additional information, for which information must be 
varied incrementally.2
 The premise of the quasi-spectator model, viz., that information is directly related 
to consensus, runs counter to what one would conclude from the few studies that shed 
light on this relationship. For example, Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) report a series 
of experimental and field studies of bargaining with plentiful information. They find that 
informing subjects of their positions increases rates of bargaining disputes and impasse, 
which they trace to biased processing of information. This claim finds support in the 
psychology literature indicating that biases increase with the number of criteria at one’s 
                                                          
2 Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984) present contrasting versions of a question where information is stated as facts 
or as beliefs, but the basic information is not manipulated, let alone incrementally. 
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disposal (e.g., Dunning, Meyerowitz and Holzberg, 1989). Nevertheless, these studies 
involve stakeholders, i.e., implicated parties whose judgments are impacted by self-
interest. It is not surprising that, when interests diverge, views are biased and disperse. 
 In contrast, the current study is concerned with the moral claims of third parties. 
Even with quasi-spectators, however, it is not clear on a priori grounds whether or how 
information would affect convergence. On the one hand, additional information could 
complicate moral reasoning, resulting in increased noise. Also, if individuals do not agree 
on moral principles or on their relative importance or residual interests corrupt their 
judgment, information could introduce elements that feed these tendencies toward 
divergent views. On the other hand, the quasi-spectator approach outlined above 
postulates that people operate from a common set of principles. If agents entertain 
multiple principles, then this model posits that, at least as impartial spectators, they share 
a common sense of how to weigh the principles, i.e., there is a high level of agreement on 
trade-offs. Relevant information allows quasi-spectators to reduce the role of potentially 
differing implicit assumptions and to evaluate more accurately the implications of their 
principles, resulting in greater consensus. Whether information contributes to convergent 
or divergent moral judgments by spectators is an important open question that, to my 
knowledge, has not been examined systematically elsewhere. 
 Some experimental evidence suggests that information promotes consensus. In 
Konow (2005), I analyzed a series of studies, including bargaining experiments by Alvin 
Roth and his colleagues, in which information was varied. High information was 
generally found to decrease the variance of expected payoffs. Nevertheless, those 
experiments were not designed to address the question at hand and, therefore, limit the 
conclusions one can draw in this regard for at least two reasons. First, those experiments 
involved stakeholders bargaining over their own payoffs rather than spectators expressing 
unbiased preferences. Second, the procedures of the experiments provided little or no 
context for moral judgment, even in the high information conditions. 
 The highly controlled conditions of the laboratory can prove a powerful means of 
investigation, and it is often appropriate to restrict information about many variables, 
including subject contributions, abilities, choices, needs, and identity. The results of a 
number of experiments suggest, however, that subject decisions under such conditions 
are not always representative of the more complex distributive justice preferences 
typically encountered in real life. In particular, when the context is very lean, decisions 
appear to be made more frequently based on heuristics than is the case in high stake 
situations in real life. For example, in many experiments there is no justice relevant 
information and equal splits often emerge as a modal choice, including in the simple 
versions of the ultimatum game, the dictator game, and the trust game. Equal splits 
appear to arise here by default, not because of any general preference for equality.3 
Under such conditions, increasing information about individuals and variables of interest 
might very well increase variance, ostensibly contrary to the claim of the quasi-spectator 
model. But the object of the current study, and the domain of the quasi-spectator model 
                                                          
3 I argue in Konow (2003) that equality of allocations is not a general principle of justice, i.e., one that most 
agents value in general terms under the ideal conditions of perfect information. Rather, it surfaces for a 
variety of other reasons, including as a special case of other general principles, due to negotiation or 
cognitive costs, or as a kind of “default” when no information is available about the variables needed for 
more careful justice evaluation. 
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that motivates it, is moral judgments made under conditions approximating the usually 
richer information set found in the real world. That is, our method proceeds from a base 
(the low information condition) in which decisions at least potentially reflect some degree 
of moral reflection and do not just reduce by default to equal splits, and it then explores 
the effect on variance of additional information (in the high information condition). For 
this reason, it employs surveys applied to a number of real allocation problems in a wide 
range of situations with some context, even in the low information conditions. 
 
2. Justice: Principles and Trade-offs 
 
 One of the two main goals of this study is to produce evidence on distributive 
preferences and on the trade-offs between conflicting distributive goals, or justice in a 
broad sense. Justice is also the context within which the other subject matter of this 
paper, impartiality, is studied. This section presents the content of the questionnaire and 




 The complete questionnaire consists of eight vignettes (or hypothetical scenarios) 
that cover a wide range of social institutions and policy areas. Four are inspired by four 
different concepts of justice (efficiency, need, accountability and rectificatory justice) and 
four are framed in the context of four different fields of applied ethics (environmental 
ethics, media ethics, bioethics and business ethics). A word about the first three concepts 
of justice (efficiency, need and accountability) is in order: these are three principles that I 
have proposed as a part of a general theory of distributive justice (e.g., Konow, 2003). In 
that theory, context, or the set of salient variables and individuals, determines the relative 
importance of principles and the trade-offs among them. Actually, any set of principles or 
values that is associated with a significant shift in responses when information is added 
would have sufficed, but I chose ones that have been found in other studies to have 
substantial explanatory power. Here the principles are applied to new contexts, which 
permits additional tests of their generality. 
 
Table 1 




    Social institution   Policy area 
Justice concept 
     1. Efficiency principle   Firm    Resource allocation 
     2. Need principle   Government   Welfare 
     3. Accountability principle  Labour market   Wage setting 
 
 
    4. Rectificatory justice   Judiciary   Tort law 
Applied ethics 
     5. Environmental ethics  Regulatory agency  Environmental regulation 
     6. Media ethics   Media/entertainment industry Mergers 
     7. Bioethics    Health care industry  Resource allocation 
     8. Business ethics   Firm    Globalization 
 
 Table 1 summarizes the eight questions according to which of the four justice 
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concepts or four applied ethics fields they belong, the social institution in which they are 
framed and the specific policy area that is addressed. Tables 2 and 3 exhibit the content 
of the vignettes. The passages in both brackets and italic were not present in the low 
information condition but were added to the text in the high information condition. I will 
now discuss briefly each of the questions. 
 
Table 2 
Justice Concept Questions 
 
1. A large company has two divisions. The one division produces film for traditional cameras, which is the 
business the company was founded on. The other, newer division is focused on technologies for digital 
photography and printing. Due to changing consumer demand, the traditional film division is on the decline 
and its share of company revenues is falling. The company’s budget for plant, machinery and equipment in 
the coming year totals $10 billion, and its board must decide how much of this to devote to the film 
division and how much to the digital division. [Company finance analysts expect revenues from the film 
division to fall from 60% currently to only 10% in five years. In order to protect the company’s financial 
health and survival, they recommend focusing expenditures for plant, machinery and equipment on the 
digital division and devoting $9 billion of next year’s budget to the digital division and only $1 billion to 
the film division.] How much of this $10 billion do you think the board should budget for the film division 
of the company (Enter a number in billions of dollars from 0 to 10)? 
  $ _______ billion 
 
2. The state provides support to those in need for a limited period of time. For example, John, who needs 
one year to complete a high school diploma, is eligible to receive such support. [The state has determined 
that the basic needs of a person living in this area for food, housing and clothing equal $800 per month.] 
How much do you think the state should provide in total support for John per month (Enter a number from 
$0 to $1000)? 
  $ ________ per month 
 
3. Suppose Adam and Bill worked last weekend stuffing envelopes for a mass mailing. This job took a total 
of 11 man hours, but Adam worked more hours than Bill. [Specifically, Adam worked 8 hours whereas Bill 
worked 3 hours.] The total pay for this 11 hour job is $100. How much of this $100 do you think Adam and 
Bill should each receive (Enter amounts for each person below and make sure the two amounts total $100)? 
  Adam $ _______ 
  Bill $ _______ 
  Total     $100 
 
4. You are the judge deciding the outcome of a civil suit brought by a motorcyclist against the driver of a 
car that hit him. The suit demands $100,000 in damages for medical expenses, loss of earnings and pain 
and suffering (vehicle repairs were covered by insurance), but the actual award could be anything between 
$0 and $100,000. In court testimony, the facts have been presented as follows. The motorcyclist pulled out 
of a parking lot into a street a few feet from a stop sign and was thrown from his motorcycle when the car 
struck him. [As a result of the accident, the motorcyclist has lost earnings of about $3,000 due to missed 
work time and has incurred medical expenses of around $12,000.] How much do you think the court should 
require driver of the car to pay the motorcyclist (Enter a number from $0 to $100,000)? 
  $ ___________ 
 
 Question 1 is motivated by the efficiency principle, which advocates the 
maximization of aggregate surplus. A number of studies have found support for this goal, 
e.g., Charness and Rabin (2002) and Kritikos and Bolle (2001). Specifically, this question 
addresses the matter of allocating firm resources to maximize consumer satisfaction and 
shareholder value in the context of the kind of real technological changes we have 
observed in recent years. Question 2 addresses the need principle, which simply requires 
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that allocations be sufficient to meet each individual’s basic requirements for life, 
including for food, shelter and clothing. In this example, needs are met through state 
support. Evidence of a concern for needs is apparent, for example, in the studies of 
Gaertner, Jungeilges and Neck (2001) and Kravitz and Gunto (1992). 
 Question 3 reflects the accountability principle. Whereas the efficiency and need 
principles deal with the absolute size of allocations, the accountability principle addresses 
the relative size of allocations across individuals. It calls for allocations to be in 
proportion to the factors that affect contributions and that individuals can control. For 
example, a worker who is twice as productive as another should be paid twice as much, if 
his greater productivity is due entirely to factors he can control (e.g., hours worked) but 
not if it is due to factors outside his control (e.g., a physical disability). This principle 
finds support in the results of surveys and experiments (see Konow, 2000, 2003). Since 
the only difference between the workers in question 3 is hours worked, one would expect 
a fair distribution of earnings to be in proportion to their fraction of total hours. 
 Question 4 is about rectificatory, or corrective, justice. Whereas the three 
principles outlined above deal with distribution, this concept has to do with 
redistribution. Rectificatory justice, which can be traced to Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics, addresses an initial injustice that must be rectified by the redistribution of benefits 
or burdens between individuals in order to establish or re-establish equity according to 
the reigning justice principle or principles in the particular context. In the case in which 
one party is wronged by another, Aristotle’s claim is simply that the one should 
compensate the other for losses. The scenario in this question is inspired by a tort case 
based on a real trial that was employed in a series of studies of fairness bias reported in 
Babcock and Loewenstein (1997).4
 The first four questions focus on individual justice concepts. The next four 
questions, on the other hand, draw from applied ethics fields and pose contemporary 
problems in which conflicts between different distributive goals are more prominent. 
These are scenarios for which people can be expected to have distributive preferences, 
indeed potentially conflicting ones, but these questions are constructed without any 
presuppositions about what those preferences are. An important goal of the analysis is to 
examine the effects of additional information on mean judgments and to consider the 
implications for justice concepts and trade-offs between competing distributive goals. On 
the matter of variance, however, another feature of questions 1 through 4 is that they are 
open to the objection that any convergence might be due to a focal point effect associated 
with the additional information. 
 Nevertheless, evidence against the focal point hypothesis is produced if 
convergence occurs even when the additional information either provides multiple and 
disperse values, as in question 5, or provides no specific values, as in question 6. 
Question 5 involves a classic case of a negative externality in which the benefits of 
pollution reduction must be weighed against the costs in terms of lost jobs. Question 6 
portrays a scenario inspired by the Time Warner merger of 1989, where the private 
interests of corporations are balanced against the public good of providing information on 
matters of public interest. 
 
 
                                                          
4 I wish to thank Linda Babcock for kindly sharing the materials they used in those studies. 
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Table 3 
Applied Ethics Questions 
 
5. The Environmental Protection Agency (or EPA) is responsible for regulating the discharge of degradable 
waste by a pulp mill into a river. The pulp mill involved is located in a different region of the country. The 
EPA must decide whether to require the pulp mill to reduce its waste discharges into the river and, if so, by 
how much. Doing so would reduce various adverse effects of the discharge, but complying with EPA 
requirements would also require the pulp mill to cut its labor force of 400 workers and, perhaps, to close 
down altogether. [Cutting the waste by 30% would eliminate the noxious odors coming from the river but 
would result in the unemployment of 10 workers at the pulp mill. Cutting the waste by 60% would also 
make the river safe for drinking, swimming and fishing, but would cause a total of 20 workers to be laid off. 
Eliminating the waste altogether (that is, reducing it by 100%) would allow the return of an additional type 
of fish valued by some sports fishermen but would make the pulp mill unprofitable so that it would have to 
close down and lay off all 400 of its workers.] By how much, if any, do you think the EPA should require 
the pulp mill to reduce its discharges (Enter a number from 0% for “no reduction” to 100% for “complete 
elimination” in the space below)? 
  ______ % 
 
6. Newstime, Inc. is a financially sound corporation that publishes several long established and respected 
magazines. These magazines provide the sole source of its $30 billion in annual revenue and represent 
about one-tenth of the magazine market nationwide. There are numerous smaller magazine publishers, but 
they generally specialize in niche markets and do not have sufficient resources or expertise to support 
general news reporting. Several companies in the movie industry are interested in merging with Newstime 
in order to take advantage of mutually beneficial business opportunities. The largest and most profitable 
merger would be with Entertainment Studios, which would generate estimated total annual revenues of 
$100 billion from the combined magazine and movie operations. [Opponents of this merger argue that 
similar mergers have resulted in higher magazine prices and have seriously compromised journalistic 
integrity. They give many examples, such as the case in which, after such a merger, a once venerable news 
magazine ignored news of wars and humanitarian disasters in favor of sensationalized coverage aimed at 
promoting second rate movies produced within its entertainment division.] The possibilities for Newstime, 
then, are 1) to break up and become smaller and more specialized, 2) to maintain its operations at their 
current size ($30 billion annual revenue), or 3) to become a larger corporation by merging with a film and 
TV corporation. In terms of annual revenue, how large a corporation do you think Newstime should be 
(Enter a number in billions of dollars from 0 to 100 in the space below)? 
  $ ______ billion 
 
7. A hospital budget committee must decide how much of the budget it controls to allocate to the hospital’s 
emergency services versus to its preventive services for the community. [At present, many patients in the 
community go to the emergency room for their non-emergency needs because they are uninsured. By 
increasing the budget to preventative services to 60%, the needs of these patients would be covered, and 
the reduced burden on emergency services would allow it to provide almost the same level of services as 
previously.] What percentage of the budget do you think should be allocated to preventative services (Enter 
a number from 0% to 100% in the space below)? 
  ______ % 
 
8. A medium sized manufacturing company has already moved 20% of its operations from the US to a 
developing country because of cost considerations. [The company’s Chief Financial Officer (CFO) has 
commissioned several studies and reports that the company must move 60% of its operations to the 
developing country or it will go bankrupt.] What percentage of its operations do you think this company 
should locate in the developing country, whereby any remaining operations remain in the US (Enter a 
number from 0% to 100% in the space below)? 
  ______ % 
 
 In many communities, emergency care has been threatened in recent years and is 
viewed by some as being at critically low levels. Question 7 addresses the provision of 
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emergency care versus preventative services at a hospital that has insufficient resources 
to fund both fully. One of the important transformations associated with globalization is 
the movement of many manufacturing operations from developed countries to developing 
countries. Question 8 describes the situation of a US company that must decide how 
much of its operations to locate in a developing country. 
 
2.2. Design and administration of survey 
 
 This study employs a questionnaire design consisting of vignettes administered to 
subjects who are university students. This approach has been widely employed in the 
empirical social choice literature, e.g., Gaertner, Jungeilges and Neck (2001) and 
Schokkaert and Capeau (1991). I will review some of the reasons for these choices (and a 
few have already been alluded to), but a more detailed discussion of using a student 
subject pool and of the advantages and disadvantages of different methods of 
investigation into justice preferences can be found in Konow (2003). 
 Experiments allow stricter controls, but we are interested here in judgments 
embedded in real social institutions, and vignettes provide a contextual richness that is 
better suited to that end. On a related point, such scenarios have been shown to aid 
reasoning in comparison to abstract problem solving. A survey was also a more practical 
choice, given the large number of scenarios, the between subjects design for the low and 
high information treatments of each scenario, and the more than 100 observations that 
were collected for each information condition of each scenario. This concern was 
amplified by the fact that the results analysed in this paper were a fraction of a larger 
study that involved not only the two versions of each question reported here but a total of 
twelve versions per scenario. Moreover, it would be prohibitively costly to investigate 
this many variations in paid experiments or the field. Material stakes have sometimes 
been shown to produce significant differences in behaviour (e.g., Forsythe, Horowitz, 
Savin and Sefton, 1994), although Rubinstein (1999) compares numerous studies with 
and without pay and concludes that the results are qualitatively the same. Nevertheless, 
stakes risk introducing a different bias that is troubling for this particular study, namely, a 
self-interested bias. Hypothetical decisions, on the other hand, are an appropriate means 
for targeting the impartial preferences of interest here. Given the large number of total 
observations needed, a convenience sample of students was used. Specifically, students 
signed up to participate in the survey to satisfy a course requirement for psychology and 
economics classes. Student respondents are standard in empirical social choice, and a 
comparison of student and non-student populations across a number of studies of fairness 
and moral judgment suggests no remarkable pattern of subject pool effects. 
 Seeing the actual questions in the previous section, the reader might have a sense 
of the direction in which the additional information could carry responses. Indeed, that is 
exactly what is hoped for, if the premise behind the quasi-spectator model is correct: the 
interpretation of any convergence in the high versus low information conditions is 
precisely that the additional information allows respondents to evaluate the fairness of 
allocations more accurately based on their common values, which readers presumably 
also share, on average. Nevertheless, this could also raise the suspicion that convergence 
is specific to the wording of the questions (apart from the focal point issue addressed in 
the previous section). Although this concern can never be entirely dismissed given the 
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contextual richness of vignettes, a brief description of the method for selecting the 
context should hopefully diminish it. 
 The data for this study were drawn from a larger project that explored empirically 
the effects of both relevant and irrelevant information on spectators and two types of 
stakeholders (the other results are reported in Konow, 2006). As previously described, 
informational relevance is defined here empirically as content that produces a statistically 
significant shift in mean spectator responses. In this project, irrelevant information is 
defined as content, which when added to relevant information, does not produce a 
statistically significant change in mean responses of spectators. Content satisfying these 
criteria was chosen partly through a trial and error process. This process began with 
content that was expected to alter responses, in the case of relevant information, and that 
was not expected to do so, in the case of irrelevant information. Expectations, however, 
were proven wrong on numerous occasions: context expected ex ante to cause a shift 
sometimes did not, and content expected ex ante not to change mean responses often did. 
Ultimately, wording was chosen and information was categorized as relevant or irrelevant 
based, not on ex ante expectations or on its effect on variance, but on ex post statistical 
tests of differences in means. If, in fact, it appeals to common values, relevant 
information does imply a greater degree of specificity, but its relevance is demonstrated 
empirically by changes in mean views, as needed to test the quasi-spectator approach. 
 Various measures were undertaken consistent with good survey design. In order 
not to tax respondent attention, no subject answered more than six questions, and on each 
questionnaire form, long versions of scenarios were balanced with short versions of other 
scenarios. Simple and clear instructions prompted respondents to choose the allocation 
corresponding to what they thought “should” be done in each scenario (instructions and 
the demographic questionnaire can be found in the Appendix). To deal with possible 
order effects, a randomized Latin square design was employed. That is, scenarios were 
randomly assigned to a variety of different orders. To facilitate comparison of results 
across scenarios, the response interval for all questions was from zero to a power of ten 
(i.e., 10, 100, 1000, etc.). A total of 1383 respondents participated in this study, which 
was conducted from November 2003 to April 2006. The author read the instructions and 
answered any questions for all sessions. Participants were seated at a distance and turned 
in their forms so that no one, including the author, could trace a form to a given subject. 
 
3. Results and Analysis 
 
 Section 3.1 presents the results on means and variances for the high and low 
information conditions of each scenario as well as tests of differences in means and 
variances between the two treatments. Multivariate regression analyses that include 
personal characteristics are then reported in Section 3.2. 
 
3.1. Analysis of Means and Variances 
 
 The mean, variance and number of observations are summarized by question and 
information condition in Table 4. Tests of differences in means and variances are also 
presented in this table. Considering first the effects of information on mean responses to 
questions, the additional information in the high information condition shifted views at  
 13
Table 4 




      Information condition 
       High    Low        Hypothesis tests 
 
       Mean    Mean  Difference  Difference 
     Variance Variance  in means in variances 
Q
 
uestion     Observs.  Observs. (t-statistic) (F-statistic) 
Justice concept 
     1. Efficiency principle  2.53  3.85  –1.32*** 
     2.32  6.58  (–4.70)  –4.26*** 
 
 
    111  112    (2.83) 
     2. Need principle   771  444  327*** 
     43,759  68,736  (9.89)  –24,977** 
 
 
    105  102    (1.57) 
     3. Accountability principle 73.4  60.2  13.2*** 
     36.8  44.9  (15.43)  –8.1 
     112  112    (1.22) 
 
     4. Rectificatory justice  33,245  55,157  –21,912*** 
     0.41E9  1.19E9  (–5.96)  –0.78E9*** 
 
 
    108  122    (2.90) 
Applied ethics 
     5. Environmental ethics  60.1  42.1  18.0*** 
     245.1  620.7  (6.23)  –375.6*** 
 
 
    104  103    (2.53) 
     6. Media ethics   46.4  58.6  –12.2*** 
     515.9  1018.1  (–3.44)  –502.2*** 
 
 
    121  122    (1.97) 
     7. Bioethics   56.7  44.8  12.8*** 
     78.7  286.8  (6.86)  –208.1*** 
     108  103    (3.64) 
 
     8. Business ethics   54.9  35.1  19.8*** 
     405.4  603.2  (6.97)  –197.8** 
 
 
    129  123    (1.49) 
Notes: */**/*** denotes significance at the 10/5/1% level. The tests of difference in means are based on 
two-tail t-tests. For question 4, variance is expressed in billions of dollars (i.e., E9). 
 
high levels of significance. Beginning with the justice questions, the shifts are as 
predicted. The additional information in question 1 on the consequences for consumers 
and stakeholders in the company results in a significant decrease in funding for the film 
division, in line with a concern for efficiency. In question 2, information on the high cost 
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of meeting basic needs is associated with an increase in support for the needy individual. 
Explicit information about the larger than expected discrepancy in hours between the two 
workers in question 3 results in increase in pay to the one who worked longer and a 
proportional distribution of pay consistent with the accountability principle: Adam 
worked 72.7% of the total hours (8 out of 11) , and respondents gave him 73.4% of the 
total pay, an insignificant difference (t=1.19, two-tailed p=.23). In question 4, 
information about the costs associated with the accident causes a significant reduction in 
judgments in the direction of compensating that loss (perhaps with some compensation 
for pain and suffering). All of these results strongly indicate the impact of the three 
principles of distributive justice and of rectificatory justice. 
 The applied ethics questions were not consciously designed with specific 
distributive principles in mind. An analysis of their means is, therefore, less interesting 
than with the first four questions, so I will discuss their means only briefly. Additional 
information about the consequences for the environment and employment of pollution 
reduction reduces allowable discharges in Question 5. Information about the potential 
adverse effects for news reporting of a merger in question 6 is associated with decreased 
support for merging. For question 7, information about the ability to increase preventative 
services with minimal sacrifice to emergency services results in an increase in funding to 
the former. Information about the dangers of the status quo in question 8 motivates 
respondents to support moving a larger fraction of operations abroad. 
 A comparison of variances across information conditions is striking: high 
information is associated with reduced variance in every instance, and these reductions 
are significant at the 5% level for seven of eight questions.5 The quasi-spectator approach 
predicts that increased relevant information will, on average, reduce variance, which 
these results corroborate. Variance falls significantly with information even in the case of 
question 5, where the text provides multiple values, and question 6, where the additional 
information states no values. In general, an examination of the specific responses of 
subjects in the high information condition provides little support that the shifts are merely 
a focal point effect. Focal points should, by definition, attract a high percentage of 
responses, but only in the cases of questions 5 and 7 do more than one-half of 
respondents choose a number implied by the information, and the percentage of subjects 
choosing such an allocation in the other six questions runs between only 15% and 31%. 
 
3.2. Regression Analysis 
 
 The results reported above suggest that distributive preferences are impacted by 
the information provided in the scenarios. Nevertheless, it is possible that these effects 
are operating through some tertiary variable. Moreover, even if justice relevant 
information is driving these results, the question remains about the size and importance of 
these ethical considerations relative to other forces. In this section, therefore, we consider 
the effects of various personal characteristics on responses. These are interesting, both 
because of the possibility that justice evaluation differs across gender, race, major, 
                                                          
5 In the case of question 3, where these differences are not significant, the variance is quite low in the high 
information condition, but the reduction is relatively small, because the variance in the low information 
condition is also rather small. This appears to be a fluke: knowing only that Adam worked longer than John 
in the low information condition, many respondents guessed that the former worked 60% of the hours. 
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income class, etc., and because these characteristics might also serve as proxies for other 
influences on moral judgment besides justice. As an example of the latter, low income 
respondents might support more redistribution in the welfare scenario because of a self- 
interested identification with that group (and, conversely, high income might support less 
redistribution out of self-interest). 
 Table 5 reports the results of OLS regressions of the pooled responses from the 
high and low information conditions on a set of explanatory variables for each of the 
eight questions. The first six regressors are dummy variables. The Information dummy 
equals 1 for the High Information condition and 0 for the Low Information condition. 
The Gender dummy equals 1 for female and 0 for male. The Nonwhite dummy equals 0 
for white and 1 for all other categories – Nonwhite was collapsed into a single variable 
due to the low number of observations in certain more specific categories and because of 
the mostly similar patterns for nonwhites. The college dummies (Business, 
Communications/Fine Arts, Science/Engineering) identify which of the four colleges at 
this university the respondent’s major is in, where Liberal Arts is the omitted category. 
Class is the year in school, followed by Age, Expenditures on all categories during the 
school year, Parents’ annual income (estimated to intervals of $25,000), Hours worked by 
the respondent per week and annual Earnings over the past year. The personal 
characteristic variables mostly had low or insignificant correlations with one another. 
Two exceptions were the relatively high Class/Age and Hours worked/Earnings 
correlations, respectively. Therefore, I ran four separate regressions for each question 
using only two variables from each of these categories (i.e., Class/Hours, Class/Earnings, 
Age/Hours, Age/Earnings). These revealed no differences in the signs of significant 
variables and almost no differences in levels of significance, so the regressions reported 
here use the complete set of explanatory variables.6
 In Table 5, the Information dummy is highly significant for all eight questions. 
Indeed, this variable has the highest level of significance of any explanatory variable in 
every regression. The signs of the information effect on responses controlling for other 
variables are consistent with the simple results on means in Table 4. In fact, even the 
magnitudes of the information effects in Table 5 are very close to the differences in 
means in Table 4. Of the 88 remaining coefficients on the personal characteristic 
variables, only 9% (i.e., 8) are significant at the 5% level. I will discuss the personal 
characteristic variables briefly and suggest interpretations of the significant results. 
 Gender is not significantly related to moral judgments in these scenarios, contrary 
to some studies of social preferences, although probably consistent with most. The 
significant coefficient on the Nonwhite dummy in question 2 indicates that this group 
supports $81 more welfare support per month than whites. This might reflect a stronger 
belief on their part in the value of government support for education and for addressing 
basic needs. Only two results on major are significant, whereby no coefficient on Science 
and Engineering is significant. Business students support about $2 less than the 
proportional pay (and less than Liberal Arts students) in question 3. Perhaps as future  
                                                          
6 In the few cases where significance changes, most involve significant variables being more so using the 
complete set, contrary to expectations, which should allay any concern that the impact of any personal 
characteristic is being understated in the reported regressions. The one exception is question 6, where 
Expenditures generates a p-value slightly greater than 0.05 in the regression with all regressors and a p-






              Question 
 
Regressors          1. Efficiency      2. Need         3. Account.       4. Rectific.      5. Environ.      6. Media         7. Bioeths.         8. Busns.  
Information   –1.283*** 333.3*** 13.34*** –21637*** 19.08*** –12.74*** 13.75*** 18.59*** 
    (0.288)  (33.3)  (0.82)  (3936)  (2.97)  (3.57)  (1.89)  (2.91)  
Gender   –0.011  –4.6  –0.55  4137  4.45  0.38  1.29  –1.80 
    (0.300)  (35.7)  (0.86)  (4202)  (3.18)  (3.68)  (2.00)  (3.09)  
Nonwhite   0.458  81.5*  –1.69  4549  –2.11  3.43  –0.09  –0.36 
    (0.315)  (37.3)  (0.90)  (4148)  (3.33)  (3.72)  (2.05)  (3.08)  
Business   –0.280  –23.4  –2.09*  –657  0.95  –2.65  –2.30  –2.80 
    (0.347)  (42.1)  (0.97)  (4571)  (3.71)  (4.30)  (2.23)  (3.53)  
Communications/Fine Arts 0.599  –2.6  –1.70  –1451  –1.80  –18.01** –0.25  –6.10 
    (0.431)  (55.8)  (1.28)  (6302)  (4.94)  (6.03)  (2.62)  (4.47)  
Science/Engineering  0.106  –5.3  0.04  –14087 –2.85  2.33  –4.05  4.03 
    (0.536)  (56.2)  (1.45)  (8262)  (5.12)  (6.80)  (3.95)  (5.82)  
Class    0.405  –19.1  –0.29  4426  1.48  1.68  1.38  2.77 
    (0.299)  (30.0)  (1.02)  (3477)  (2.62)  (3.55)  (1.31)  (2.86)  
Age    –0.567** 18.8*  –0.51  –599  0.29  –1.80  0.63  –4.33* 
    (0.206)  (7.7)  (0.83)  (2828)  (0.68)  (2.73)  0.41  (2.15)  
Expenditures ($1000/year) 0.014  –1.5  0.00  255*  –0.10  0.20  0.02  0.04 
    (0.010)  (1.4)  (0.02)  (114)  (0.13)  (0.10)  (0.05)  (0.08)  
Parents income  0.031  9.1  –0.25  –413  –0.35  1.94  –0.48  0.36 
    (0.082)  (9.7)  (0.23)  (1096)  (0.85)  (1.00)  (0.53)  (0.81)  
Hours worked (per week) –0.010  –0.9  0.00  –234  –0.17  –0.10  0.07  –0.16 
    (0.015)  (1.8)  (0.05)  (225)  (0.17)  (0.20)  (0.11)  (0.18)  
Earnings ($1000/year) 0.092** 1.8  –0.06  81  –0.06  0.10  –0.12  0.46 
    (0.030)  (7.3)  (0.14)  (418)  (0.06)  (0.44)  (0.23)  (0.38)  
Observations   214  204  216  220  203  237  202  247  
R-squared   0.16  0.37  0.60  0.17  0.20  0.13  0.25  0.19  
Notes: */**/*** denotes a p-value less than .05/.01/.001. Standard errors are in parentheses. The omitted categories for the dummy variables are white, male and Liberal Arts 
College. 
 
managers, these students are more sensitive to the appearance of equity (i.e., equality) 
than to real equity (i.e., proportionality). Communications students strongly support 
keeping Newstime smaller, against the forces of merging. The most plausible explanation 
seems to be that, by virtue of their professionally oriented training, they are more 
sensitive than other majors to the adverse impact on the journalistic mission of the 
magazine of merging with an entertainment company. 
 Class has no significant impact, but Age has three that seem reasonable. Older 
respondents appear to be more efficiency-oriented in question 1 (for every additional year 
of age, budgeting $567 million less to the less efficient division), to be more generous in 
supporting the completion of the student’s education in question 2 (by about $19 per year 
of age), and to want to protect US operations over foreign outsourcing of jobs to a greater 
extent in question 8 (by moving about 4% fewer operations abroad per year of age). 
Respondents in question 4 want to award the damaged party $255 more for every $1000 
more they spend each year, or $3842 for a one standard deviation difference in 
expenditures ($15,066). Parents’ income and Hours worked have no significant effects. 
Subjects who earn more seem less supportive of efficiency changes in question 1, the 
only significant result for which no obvious explanation occurs. 
 These results suggest that personal characteristics occasionally insinuate 
themselves into these moral decisions, even in the case of spectators. Nevertheless, as 
predictors of distributive preferences, personal characteristics are neither as reliable nor 
as significant as the information dummies. A separate question, however, is how 
important a variable is, i.e., how much of the variance in the dependent variable a 
regressor explains. That is, although information is more significant than any personal 
characteristic, personal characteristics might, nonetheless, explain a higher fraction of the 
variance in distributive preferences than information. The typical approach to this is to 
examine semi-partial correlations, i.e., the percentage of the variance in the dependent 
variable that a given regressor uniquely explains, and to compare these for different 
regressors. This is equivalent to the change in the value of the R-squared when a variable 
is added to the regression.7 Based on this, tests show that information accounts for a 
larger fraction of the variance in distributive preferences than any single personal 
characteristic in all scenarios. Indeed, information explains more variance than all of the 
personal characteristics combined for all but one of the eight questions. This is illustrated 
in Table 6, which shows the R-squared values for separate regressions on the information 
dummy and on all personal characteristics. All personal characteristics combined explain 
only 3% to 8% of the variance, whereas information accounts for 9% to 52% of the 
variance, ignoring question 6. The former outweighs the latter in question 6, in part 
because of the strong reaction of Communications students, but information still explains 
more variance than any single personal characteristic variable even in this scenario. 
 The results in this section suggest that information affects views of fairness in a 
manner consistent with a common set of spectator values. This comes from an analysis of 
the effects of general principles and agreed upon trade-offs on means and variances. 
Among the possible influences, personal characteristics always matter less than 
                                                          
7 The sum of these semi-partial correlations will not, however, usually add up to the R-squared for the 
regression with all regressors because of correlations between the regressors and for the practical reason 
that the R-squared sometimes differs due to different numbers of observations in the regressions caused by 
missing data (as is the case with these data). 
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information, and usually do not matter at all. Relevant information produces the strongest 
and most robust effects on moral judgments. 
 
Table 6 




       Regressors (R-squared) 
            Information          Personal 
Q
 




    1. Efficiency principle    0.09   0.08 
 
 
    2. Need principle     0.32   0.04 
 
 
    3. Accountability principle   0.52   0.07 





    5. Environmental ethics    0.16   0.03 




    7. Bioethics     0.19   0.04 




 This study laid out two goals: to expand our understanding of unbiased 
preferences for general distributive principles and for trade-offs between distributive 
goals in real life situations, and to state and investigate empirically the quasi-spectator 
model of impartiality. On the first point, the results from the high information conditions 
of the first four questions are consistent with general justice concepts. Efficiency is found 
to matter when changing consumer demand requires an adjustment in a firm’s 
investments. Respondents increase state support to a student to meet his basic needs. 
Consistent with accountability, earnings are put into proportion with the hours workers 
choose. Compensation to the victim of a vehicular accident is adjusted toward damages. 
In the last four questions, a high level of agreement in the trade-offs between competing 
distributive goals is found in the cases of reducing pollution versus preserving jobs, 
promoting corporate profits versus protecting the integrity of news reporting, balancing 
resources for preventative care with those for emergency care, and ensuring the solvency 
of a company versus protecting domestic jobs. 
 On the matter of impartiality, the quasi-spectator model postulates a direct 
relationship between relevant information and consensus, i.e., reduced variance in moral 
judgments. This result is, in fact, opposed to other important theoretical claims and 
empirical findings. First, normative approaches to impartiality, like Rawls’s, typically 
associate impartiality with the reduction, rather than the increase, of information. Second, 
empirical studies of fairness bias suggest that information feeds self-serving biases and 
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disagreements. Of course, the important distinction in the current proposal in comparison 
to these others is the focus on informed spectators, rather than informed stakeholders. But 
a third point is that it is not obvious that increased information should favourably affect 
spectator judgments, both on a priori grounds (e.g., information could complicate moral 
reasoning) and on the basis of empirical findings. In the aforementioned related study 
(Konow, 2006), I find that irrelevant information does not reliably affect spectator 
consensus: variance might increase or decrease, but it is usually not significantly affected. 
As we see in the current study, however, relevant information does reliably reduce 
variance and is both more significant and more important in explaining the variance in 
quasi-spectator views of justice than other variables. 
 Normative work in economics and philosophy involves judgment under some 
conditions of impartiality, which, in turn, is usually associated with consensus. By 
establishing a relationship between consensus and conditions of impartiality, it is hoped 
that this paper helps to lay an empirical foundation for welfare analysis and social choice 
theory. That is, the aim is to identify views using a method that has normative appeal, 
which can then inform prescriptive theories. By embedding the empirical analysis in real 
world issues, I hope that this approach will also lead to practical policy applications, 
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